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This study proposes a new explanation for institutional differences of orga-
nizations in China. It focuses on how two organizational forms dominant in
contemporary art markets – commercial galleries and auction houses – were
first established in China in the 1990s. Based on archival and interview data,
it argues that the organizational forms were introduced to China due to
mimetic isomorphism, and that their divergences from the foreign models
are the result of unintended consequences of institutional work. It highlights
the role of individual agency, including the role of foreign nationals, in
organization-building in China. The findings also have implications for insti-
tutional theory: the article shows how the political, cultural and institutional
context in China shaped institutional work that needed to be conducted and
led to unintended consequences of institutional work.
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Studies of China’s economic transition have focused on issues such as the role of
the state in developing market capitalism, the influence of market reforms on
state power and bureaucracy, the impact of markets on societal inequality, and
the beneficiaries of market reform.1 Research of the mechanisms of China’s insti-
tutional change during market transition has primarily concentrated on the trans-
formation of pre-existing institutional structures, whereas mechanisms of
importation and transformation of new models remain under-researched.2 I
address this gap by focusing on the importation of the organizational forms of
commercial galleries and auction houses that dominate contemporary art mar-
kets internationally and in present-day China. This article studies where the mod-
els first came from, who implemented them in China, and how. It pays particular
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attention to the divergences of Chinese organizations from the original models
and to the political, cultural and institutional context of contemporary art in
China during the 1990s.
In order to understand the microprocesses of importation of organizational
models of galleries and auction houses to China and their transformation, I
argue that the concept of institutional work, and an institutional perspective in
sociology more broadly, are productive. Although a body of empirical research
of institutional work is emerging, to my knowledge, this concept has not been
applied to the empirical material of China.3 This approach makes us rethink
the origins of institutional differences during the economic transition in China.
Scholars of China and post-socialist countries in Eastern Europe explained differ-
ences in their economic organizational arrangements by a combination of new
and pre-existing structures, which they conceptualized as “hybrid forms,”4
“bricolage,”5 and “recombinant properties,”6 emphasizing path dependence
and the lingering influence of the socialist institutional order.7 In contrast, this
article looks at institutional work – at micromechanisms by which new organiza-
tional forms were introduced and implemented. As a result, it offers an alterna-
tive explanation for organizational differences. In particular, I argue that some
differences between organizations in China and abroad are not grounded in a
combination of new and pre-existing structures,8 but are an unintended outcome
of institutional work in an unstructured environment. Another advantage of this
approach is that it highlights the role of individual agency in institution building
in China.
The argument unfolds as follows. After introducing the conceptual framework,
I provide an overview of the local environment to which the models were
imported. Then I show who conducted the institutional work of implementing
these models and why. Next I discuss what institutional work was conducted,
and how it was shaped by the local political, cultural and institutional context.
Finally, I show that differences in organizations stem from the unintended con-
sequences of institutional work in an unstructured environment.
Institutional Perspective
To understand how the organizational models of commercial galleries and auc-
tion houses were introduced in China and their transformation, we need a com-
bination of concepts in institutional literature. Like some other studies of the
emergence of capitalist institutions in China,9 this article relies on institutional
theory, which addresses how and why institutions and practices are copied and
3 For an overview, see Lawrence, Leca and Zilber 2013.
4 Nee 1992.
5 Stark and Bruszt 1998.
6 Stark 1996.
7 Pieke 2016; Stark 1992; Walder 1995.
8 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Stark and Bruszt 1998.
9 Guthrie 1999.
2 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–21
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000389
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 05 Sep 2019 at 06:21:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
established. It underscores the idea that institutions are built by local historical
and cultural processes, rather than universal laws. Institutional sociologists
emphasize cultural and symbolic dimensions, such as ritual, meanings, myth
and ceremony, rejecting rational choice and functionality as reasons for organiza-
tional diffusion.10
To explain why the two models were brought to China, I rely on the concept of
isomorphism, which is used in sociological institutional literature to explain
homogenous structural features within organizational fields. This perspective
posits that organizations imitate others not because it makes them more efficient,
but because it confers legitimacy upon them, which then allows them to survive.
Organizations look similar not as a result of a market-based rationalized process,
but because “powerful forces emerge that lead them [organizations] to become
similar to one another.”11 DiMaggio and Powell distinguish three mechanisms
of isomorphic change: coercive isomorphism (related to laws and regulations),
normative isomorphism (related to education and professionalization) and
mimetic isomorphism (when in a situation of uncertainty, models that are consid-
ered legitimate are imitated). A field where isomorphism takes place can be
relatively unstructured and can span borders, which is the case with the organiza-
tional models discussed here.12
To explain how exactly the copying unfolded, I draw on the recently emerged
literature on institutional work. This concept has grown from the shift towards
agency in institutional literature.13 It emphasizes “effortful and skilful practices”
directed at “creating, maintaining, and disrupting institutions.”14 According to
this perspective, the creation of new organizational forms requires the agency of
culturally competent individual and collective actors.15 The types of institutional
work aimed at creating institutions include, for example, educating – “the educat-
ing of actors in skills and knowledge necessary to support the new institution,”
and advocacy – “the mobilization of political and regulatory support through dir-
ect and deliberate techniques of social suasion.”16 This research is in line with
studies that focus on institutional creation and the imitation of foreign organiza-
tional models in countries other than China, and that suggest the importance of
local action and entrepreneurship in these processes.17 The focus on institutional
work draws attention towards individual agency in institutional creation in China.
In what follows I show that the concept of institutional work, when applied to
cases of transporting organizational models, is useful for explaining heterogeneity
compared to original models, in this case, the heterogeneity of Chinese galleries
10 Meyer and Rowan 1977; Powell and DiMaggio 1991.
11 DiMaggio and Powell 1983.
12 Ibid.
13 DiMaggio 1988.
14 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006; Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011.
15 DiMaggio 1982; 1991.
16 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006.
17 DiMaggio 1982; 1991; Khaire 2014; Lawrence and Phillips 2004; Sato, Haga and Yamada 2015.
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and auction houses. Theorists have acknowledged the unintended consequences
of institutional work: according to them, “actors work to interpret, translate,
transpose, edit, and recombine institutions,” which leads to “unintended adapta-
tions, mutations, and other institutional consequences.”18 Many scholars of insti-
tutional work, however, have overlooked its unintended consequences, as they
have mostly focused on deliberate action and accomplishments.19 I argue that
such unintended consequences explain the divergent features of the organiza-
tional forms of galleries and auction houses in China in the 1990s.
These divergences could also be explained by what the Scandinavian branch
of new institutionalism called “translation” – the transformation of original
models and their adaptation to the new institutional environment. Translation
studies problematize the notion of isomorphism and focus on “how apparently
isomorphic organizational forms become heterogeneous when implemented in
practice in different organizational contexts.”20 Whereas institutional work is
agentic and intentional, but may have unintended outcomes, translation refers
to strategic action or to implicit messy attempts to find solutions in the new envir-
onment.21 Translation focuses on the changes of institutions in a new organiza-
tional context; institutional work does not necessarily presuppose dealing with
a new context.
This article responds to Lawrence and colleagues’ call to connect institutional
work and translation literatures.22 By focusing on the importation of organiza-
tions to a politically and culturally different and unstructured environment,
this article introduces context more forcefully into institutional work literature.
Whereas institutional work literature focuses on practices on a micro level, I
argue that the immediate environment of an institutional field and broader envir-
onment are useful for understanding the conditions and need for particular kinds
of institutional work. Although institutional work is conceptualized by Lawrence
and Suddaby as “situated,” and they suggested some delineations about what
kind of work “may be easier to accomplish” in what contexts,23 this literature
does not aim to elaborate on how environmental factors influence institutional
work. This study shows how institutional work and its outcomes are shaped by
political, cultural and institutional context and how this helps explain differences
in organizational models.
Data and Methods
This in-depth qualitative study focuses on the importation of two distinct organ-
izational forms – commercial galleries and auction houses. I focus on them
18 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011.
19 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2009, 10–11.
20 Boxenbaum and Strandgaard Pedersen 2009.
21 Ibid.; Czarniawska and Joerges 1996.
22 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011.
23 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 219, 236.
4 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–21
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000389
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 05 Sep 2019 at 06:21:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
because contemporary art organizations, closely associated with foreign art mar-
kets and consumers, are a strategic case to study the importation of models, and
because the differences between the two organizational forms are illuminating.
First, galleries usually have several employees, and auction houses have complex
organizational structures. A gallery is a space where contemporary art exhibitions
are held regularly, where sales are made at fixed prices, and artworks are primar-
ily sourced from artists. Auction houses hold regular sales where prices are not
fixed, and normally have no close ties with artists. Second, in China, galleries
only work with contemporary art, whereas auction houses trade in both contem-
porary and traditional art, and antiques.24 Contemporary art is defined here as
art that started emerging in China in the 1970s and is grounded in the Western
artistic tradition, similar to the emic category “contemporary art” (dangdai
yishu 当代艺术).25 These different characteristics result in different local environ-
ments, which helps us to understand how institutional work is shaped by context
and to explain divergence from original models.
This article focuses on the cases of the China Guardian auction house and the
Courtyard Gallery – both private companies established during the 1990s in
Beijing. Several auction houses (Duo Yun Xuan 朵云轩, China Guardian 中国
嘉德, Hanhai 瀚海) and galleries (Red Gate, ShanghART, the Courtyard
Gallery) were founded in China independently of each other, but roughly simul-
taneously. China Guardian was chosen because it was the first joint-stock auction
company specializing in Chinese art and antiques (founded in 1993, the first auc-
tion took place in 1994), and because it was the only auction house until 1996
that sold contemporary art. The Courtyard Gallery, established in 1996, was cho-
sen because it had several managers and owners throughout the years, which
allowed for good triangulation of the data.
The importance of institutional work for understanding the importation of the
two organizational models was arrived at inductively after investigating materials
pertaining to the emergence of the contemporary art market in China. For this,
I relied on a variety of data. I consulted all the documents on the 1990s available
at the Asia Art Archive (Hong Kong) in 2013, which included periodicals from
the early 1990s until the present, personal correspondence, a China Guardian
publication, and invitations to contemporary art events. This was supplemented
by interviews and media articles published in, or written about, the 1990s art
world in China retrieved from the LexisNexis database and the artron.net art
market database.
To understand the intricate processes of institutional work further, in the second
round of analysis, I focused on those materials that shed light on commercial gal-
leries and auction houses, and in particular on the two chosen cases. For instance,
24 Contemporary art sold at auctions tends to be more conservative, which was especially the case in the
1990s, yet, the China Guardian auction house has traded contemporary artists like Zhang Xiaogang
from the start.
25 Lü 2010.
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I familiarized myself with the book about the history of China Guardian authored
by its founder.26 In addition to collecting documentary data, I conducted in-depth
interviews during the period 2012–2014 with artists (n= 14), art dealers (n= 6),
auction house representatives (n= 3), collectors (n= 4), art critics (n= 3) and
other art market participants active in the Chinese art world since the 1980s and
the 1990s, and/or who worked at the organizations analysed during my research.
These interviews concerned the interviewees’ first-hand experience with the import-
ation of the models of auction houses and galleries and their broader experiences of
China’s art world in the 1980s and 1990s. Interviews typically lasted between one
and two hours and were useful for interpreting and triangulating the written
accounts. The interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded in Atlas.ti. I
used both inductive and deductive approaches when coding documentary and
interview data. Especially interviews – both published and conducted by me –
were useful for teasing out the dynamics of mimetic isomorphism and institu-
tional work, and which allowed me to distinguish the types of institutional
work involved, and influence of contextual factors on institutional work.
The specificities of the local environment emerged as important for explaining
the need for and outcomes of institutional work. To further understand the local
and foreign contexts, in addition to the data described above, I relied on in-depth
interviews collected as part of the Asia Art Archive project “Materials of the
Future,” and on art market reports, such as TEFAF (The European Fine
Art Fair) reports, China Art Market Research Reports produced by Art
Market Research Centre (AMRC), affiliated with CAFA, China’s top art acad-
emy, and Artprice reports. I also informed myself about the history of Chinese
art,27 the art worlds,28 and the development of art markets29 elsewhere.
Furthermore, this article benefited from the insights obtained during 11 months
of ethnographic fieldwork carried out mostly in Beijing between 2012 and 2014,
during which numerous observations, conversations with art world participants
and approximately 180 interviews about the functioning of China’s art market
were conducted. Although these interviewees did not necessarily have first-hand
experience of the Chinese galleries and auctions in the 1990s, they were familiar
with the founders and/or had knowledge about galleries and auctions, including
the two cases, in the 1990s and now.
Local Environmental Context
Before zooming in on the importation of the two organizational forms, it is useful
to consider the local political, cultural and institutional context. This allows us to
explain what institutional work had to be done, and why the models were
transformed.
26 Chen 2014.
27 Lü 2010; Wu 2014.
28 Wu and Wang 2010.
29 Brandellero 2015; Khaire and Wadhwani 2010.
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Art market institutions for trading in traditional Chinese art and calligraphy
existed long before the 1990s: China has boasted art markets since the Song dyn-
asty (960–1279).30 However, no commercial contemporary art galleries31 existed
in pre-Mao China, only “art shops” (huadian 画店) trading in Chinese ink wash
paintings, calligraphy and antiques. The first auction houses were established by
foreigners as branches of English, French, Japanese and other auction houses in
the late 19th century, mainly in Shanghai. The art market essentially halted dur-
ing the Maoist period, although some art was produced for export within state
organizations. Auctions were closed by decree in 1956. Artists became state
employees who were required to “serve the people.”32 Knowledge about develop-
ments in art worlds abroad, except for the Soviet Union, was lacking.
The policy of reform and opening up, implemented since the late 1970s,
resulted in emerging links with foreign art markets. Information about develop-
ments in contemporary art in Europe and the US reached China, initiating a per-
iod of artistic experimentation.33 Exhibitions of foreign artists such as
Rauschenberg were organized in China, and starting from the 1990s, Chinese
artists participated in Venice Biennale and other prestigious exhibitions abroad.
Between the late 1970s and early 1990s, a number of Chinese artists moved to the
US, Japan and other countries, where they began working with foreign galleries.
Foreign organizations started engaging with China, although not yet on a regular
basis. Sotheby’s held a charity auction in Beijing in 1988, which remained a one-
off occurrence. Foreign dealers such as Johnson Chang and Yukihito Tabata vis-
ited China and began to take an interest in Chinese artists.
These emerging links with foreign art markets indicated China’s entrance into
the transnational art market field.34 Nevertheless, interaction and the flow of
information were limited, and the political, cultural and institutional environ-
ment to which the foreign models were introduced in China, was different. As
I show later in this article, these differences shaped institutional work and led
to unintended consequences.
In contrast with established markets abroad, in early 1990s China, the contem-
porary art market was not yet institutionalized. No stable spaces for selling, and
few spaces for exhibiting experimental contemporary art existed.35 Contemporary
art was sold sporadically and directly instead of through organizations.
Exhibitions were held in the apartments of diplomats and other foreigners, in
artists’ homes or studios, in temples, parks, hotels or basements.36 The exhibited
works were usually for sale, but few were sold. Some exhibitions were held for an
30 Clunas 2009.
31 cf. Velthuis 2005.
32 Sullivan 1996.
33 Wu 2014.
34 DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer et al. 1997; Velthuis and Baia Curioni 2015.
35 DeBevoise 2014; Wu and Wang 2010.
36 Even though it says “gallery” on some of the exhibition invitations from the 1990s, such as Tao Gallery
or Wins Gallery, they were actually framing or painting shops, or temporary exhibition spaces that were
called a gallery but did not have a commercial gallery operation or structure.
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afternoon, and they mostly only attracted artists and a few foreigners. Karen
Smith, who ran the Courtyard Gallery during its first year, organized two such
exhibitions in her apartment. She explained:
…a lot of people did it at the time, and it was a social occasion, because we knew lots of foreign
people in different kind of fields, and artists who were in need of money or in need of support.
So, you know, you basically just did a Saturday afternoon, and people would come over for a
drink or maybe a beer or something and maybe they bought a few prints…
Unlike in Europe and the US, the infrastructure of contemporary art museums,
art fairs, biennales, and a contemporary art press, was absent. There were no
training programmes in contemporary art management, art history or criticism.
According to the art critics and artists whom I interviewed, most artists had a
vague idea how to price their work or how galleries or auction houses work
exactly. Artists outside the official art system had few opportunities to exhibit
at official venues. No governmental support for contemporary art, such as prizes
or fellowships, existed. Although potential Chinese buyers might have been used
to museums of traditional art and versed in Chinese art and antiques, contempor-
ary art was unfamiliar to them. As my interviewee, who was active in the art
world at the time, told me, contemporary art was “very very difficult to find.”
This lack of familiarity with contemporary art among the public and cautious
attitude of the government was particularly consequential for commercial galler-
ies that dealt only in contemporary art, as opposed to auctions that, besides con-
temporary art, primarily dealt with traditional art and antiques.
At the same time, the policy environment for setting up art market organiza-
tions was no longer overtly hostile. The government was gradually introducing
markets for cultural goods. Since the 1980s and especially since the 1990s, the
central government has promoted trade in cultural products or “culture mar-
kets.” As Xinhua news agency reported, “the green light was given by the govern-
ment which is keen to boost both the cultural and the commercial sectors to meet
the market economy.”37 The situation was especially favourable for auctions.
The prohibitions on auctions were relaxed in the 1980s. Art auctions (not orga-
nizations) were legalized again in 1991 in an attempt to curb the illegal trade
in cultural relics and regulate the market, to control what was going out of the
country and collect taxes on it. The government also planned to set up auction
houses in the long run.38 A few experiments with art auction sales occurred across
China from 1992 onwards. Some of the first auctions were organized by
government-related organizations and/or were sanctioned by local authorities.
In contrast, throughout the 1990s, no regulations about commercial galleries
existed. The authorities were cautious with, and in some cases simply uninterested
in galleries’ contemporary art. Overall, the market-focused regulations since the
late 1970s, and particularly since 1992, made the establishment of art market
37 “Paintings auction fever spreads,” Xinhua, 27 October 1993.
38 “China to strengthen art market management,” Xinhua, 11 April 1992.
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organizations possible, but the first organizations were not established top-down
by the authorities.
Initially, foreign auction houses and commercial galleries did not set up shop in
China. Neither Sotheby’s nor Christie’s were permitted to hold regular auctions
in mainland China until 2012–2013, although they had held auctions in Hong
Kong since 1973 and 1986, respectively, and had opened representative offices
in China in 1994. Foreign galleries, for example, from Taiwan and Japan, wor-
ried about the lack of local collectors and the perceived state restrictions on
art. As I show below, the first auction houses and commercial galleries were indi-
genous, rather than branches of foreign organizations.
Who Conducted Institutional Work and Why: Institutional Entrepreneurs
and Mimetic Isomorphism
Before elaborating on the intricacies of the institutional work involved in the
establishment of these organizations, I show who conducted institutional work
and why they introduced these particular models.
The institutional work of implementing the two organizational forms in China
was conducted by institutional entrepreneurs, who were groups of locally based
individuals.39 China Guardian was founded by Chen Dongsheng 陈东升 and
his team. Chen, then 36, did not (yet) occupy a central position in the nascent
art field, but he had government and business connections due to his work as
researcher at the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation. He
assembled a team, some of them university friends rather than art experts,
many in their thirties. Some were working in the state cultural sector, but not
all; the director of the oil painting department, for example, had no prior knowl-
edge of art. For traditional art, the team consulted art experts from traditional art
organizations, who helped, among other things, with consignments and apprai-
sals. For business matters, they solicited the help of, among others, Chen’s friend
from the market department of the Ministry of Culture. Early on, Chen invited
Wang Yannan 王雁南, daughter of former prime minister and general secretary
of the Communist Party, Zhao Ziyang 赵紫阳, who oversaw the 1980s economic
reforms, to join the team. My interviews indicated that she was highly respected
in art circles because of her father’s solidarity with students during the 1989
Tiananmen 天安门 protests. Wang had overseas experience as she had studied
hotel management in the US, spoke fluent English, and was deputy general man-
ager at Beijing’s five-star Great Wall Sheraton Hotel (China Guardian later set
up office there).
Whereas foreign nationals only acted as outside consultants for China
Guardian, the early galleries were mostly established by foreigners. The
Courtyard Gallery was established by American lawyer-entrepreneur, Handel
39 DiMaggio 1988.
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Lee, and other investors.40 Two of the other early galleries, Red Gate and
ShanghART, were also founded by foreigners based in China, Brian Wallace
and Lorenz Helbling. Foreigners had prior knowledge of the gallery model, eas-
ier access to buyers, and an interest in contemporary art.
Why did they establish these particular organizational forms? In both cases the
institutional entrepreneurs were pulled towards the Western models. They imi-
tated the international models not because of efficiency – the next section
shows that they were hardly efficient in the local context – but because in the
highly unstructured and uncertain environment of reform-era China the entrepre-
neurs perceived them to be “legitimate or successful.”41 This suggests a process of
“mimetic isomorphism” that took place in the transnational art field, in which
the models were brought to China from the relatively established art markets
abroad (Europe, the US and Hong Kong).
Chen clearly perceived the foreign auction houses as legitimate. He first
encountered auctions in Xinwen Lianbo 新闻联播 television programmes featur-
ing Sotheby’s and Christie’s, and was fascinated:
…in a classical building, an elegant auctioneer overlooking men and women in the audience,
rising paddles, mysterious phone calls, exchanging a word or two here and there, all of it so ele-
gant, so far away, but so impressive.42
Later, his friends showed him a newspaper article, which lamented: “with its 5,000
years of history, China has multiple cultural treasures and rich heritage, but not a
single influential art auction company.”43 This, combined with the strong impres-
sion from TV programmes, made him decide to establish an auction house.
Chen was well aware of the effect his efforts would have on the nascent market,
which could be interpreted as pointing towards efficiency and away from mimetic
isomorphism as the reason for adopting the model. However, the data presented
below indicate mimetic isomorphism. Both Chen and Wang had virtually no
knowledge of the auction business at the time. They “had no idea where to get
lots and how to auction.”44 They had no arts background and were outsiders
in the art world. “To innovate is to be the first to copy,” Chen is often quoted
in Chinese business circles as saying.45 In a situation of lack of knowledge and
uncertainty, Chen and his team imitated the internationally successful model of
Sotheby’s, which had long been active in Hong Kong. According to an interview
with Chen, “from packaging, pricing, catalogues and screens to expert and credit
systems – the Guardian imitated it all.”46 Westney wrote that those who copy
often lack first-hand knowledge of the models, which results in divergence.47
Chen’s team tried to acquire such knowledge. They consulted Sotheby’s experts
40 The Courtyard Gallery closed; one of its founders, Meg Maggio, now owns Pékin Fine Arts gallery.
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in Beijing and often went to Hong Kong to observe auctions and study organiza-
tional set-up and practices. Chen selected his first auctioneer, Gao Deming高德明,
who would later become China Guardian’s top auctioneer, based on his impres-
sions of the foreign auctions he saw on Xinwen Lianbo. Later, the Irish Times
described Gao as follows:
Typically dressed for work in bow tie and stiff wing tip collar, he models himself on Julian
Thompson, the smooth and composed senior auctioneer at Sotheby’s.48
Available photos indicate that the auction sale was set up similarly to Europe and
the US, with rows of bidders and spectators, and an auctioneer at the front. In
many ways, China Guardian was isomorphic. Imitation of the legitimate success-
ful model by the founders of China Guardian in a situation of uncertainty points
to mimetic isomorphism.
Founders of the first contemporary art galleries also viewed the Western model
as legitimate. Similar to the China Guardian team, they could not be considered
“professionals,”49 but they were familiar with the Western gallery system. They
oriented themselves towards practices common in Europe and the US. In inter-
views, they claimed they had been “build[ing] a platform” rather than operating
“like a shop.” Similar to European and US galleries, they organized regular
shows, and their space resembled a white cube gallery.50 According to Meg
Maggio, an American investor and later director of the gallery, who had been liv-
ing in Hong Kong and Beijing for a number of years, the Courtyard was:
…basically introducing a new Western model. It wasn’t that it was a cultural desert. No way.
They have their own way of exhibiting art. Their own way of using exhibition space. We were
introducing a Western way of exhibiting art.
Although they were aware of the dearth of galleries in Beijing, the Courtyard did
not aim to strategically build an art market or to make a substantial profit. As
Maggio said in an interview:51 “we were working as lawyers and we thought it
would be fun.” This suggests that copying was not driven by efficiency.
The gallery was not a serious business venture, but something investors did on
the side. It was located in the centre of Beijing, at the moat of the Forbidden City,
in the basement of an upscale restaurant. Some of the investors were more inter-
ested in the restaurant than the gallery. Others were more interested in art than
the art business. Maggio, 36 at the time, and who had collected art since the
1980s, was already involved in the contemporary art scene. For her, the gallery
was more about interaction with art and artists, about an adventure:
It was more like making beautiful exhibitions and sometimes making catalogues. So that was
more exciting than whether you’d sell the work or not. Yeah, we’d sell a few pieces and we’d
pay for everything. But we didn’t think about it almost. There was a price list, but you
48 O’Clery 1997.
49 Lawrence, Leca and Zilber 2013. Other first gallerists had no experience either.
50 Other galleries established in the 1990s were run informally from lobbies of five-star hotels and from a
Ming-dynasty tower, all highly unusual arrangements. Among the reasons were restrictions on foreign-
ers, who could not register a company in their name until the 2000s.
51 Interview with Meg Maggio, July 2014.
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didn’t have high expectations for sales. You know, you were kind of like, maybe someone might
buy something.
Karen Smith, a British national active in Beijing’s contemporary art circles, who
was initially invited to run the gallery, recounted in an interview52 that she saw
her purpose in organizing artistic activities, but “didn’t want to have anything
to do with developing the kind of market.” The Courtyard, like Red Gate and
other early galleries, grew out of friendships with artists, and was little concerned
with efficiency. In fact, because of the uncertainty of the economic and cultural
climate during the 1990s in China, it was hard for the founders to predict how
efficient the model would be.
Similar to China Guardian, my interviews with gallerists indicate that they did
not know how to organize a gallery or what the reaction to the new organiza-
tional model would be. Neither Smith nor Maggio, who, after about a year,
resigned from her job as a lawyer and took over gallery management from
Smith, had experience with running a gallery. In a situation of uncertainty,
they turned to the foreign model that they considered legitimate. Combined
with a lack of strategy or attention to efficiency, this suggests that institutional
entrepreneurs imitated the foreign gallery model in a mimetic isomorphic way.
Institutional Work as Shaped by the Local Context
Implementing the two organizational forms in China required institutional work.
Mimetic isomorphism implies adopting a model perceived as successful in a situ-
ation of uncertainty and ambiguity.53 In our cases, the organizational forms were
viewed as desirable by institutional entrepreneurs, and by foreigners, and were
meant to confer legitimacy. However, at the moment of their introduction,
they were not yet taken for granted or considered successful by most local people
in China, who were not part of the transnational contemporary art field. Neither
the authorities, nor most local artists and potential buyers, were even aware of
these organizational forms, let alone related practices. Apart from some artists,
entrepreneurs could not simply appeal to the organizations’ legitimacy (as in iso-
morphism), but to a certain extent needed to build it. They also needed to con-
duct other types of institutional work to establish the organizations. The aim
of this section is not to provide an exhaustive account of all institutional work
conducted. Instead, below I show how the local political, cultural and institu-
tional context, which was distinct from the original context and which partly dif-
fered for galleries and auction houses, shaped what institutional work had to be
done.
Both auction and gallery entrepreneurs engaged in the type of institutional
work that Lawrence and Suddaby call “educating.”54 They educated artists,
52 Interview with Karen Smith, July 2014.
53 DiMaggio and Powell 1983.
54 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006.
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(potential) buyers, auctioneers and others in at least two ways. First, they had to
educate them about contemporary art. According to Chen, at China Guardian,
oil paintings initially sold for low prices or did not sell at all.55 They had to be
put in the hallway during the auction preview, where everyone would pass
them and where the department manager would latch on to visitors and try to
convince them of their value. This was an even more acute problem for galleries,
which only dealt in contemporary art. This made it difficult for some galleries to
survive. A member of the initial China Guardian team, Gan Xuejun 甘学军,
unsuccessfully ran a gallery for several years in the late 1990s and ended up open-
ing his own auction house. As he put it:
It was difficult. I lost money, lost, because we were doing contemporary art. Nobody cared for
Zhang Xiaogang 张晓刚 or Yue Minjun 岳敏君. We couldn’t sell Mao Yan 毛焰.56 […] So I
went back to the auction business. 57
At the Courtyard Gallery, according to Smith, at least in the first years, artworks
either did not get sold or got sold to acquaintances as a favour. Interviews indi-
cate that early galleries relied on foreign buyers, with the first local buyers
appearing only in the early 2000s. Yet, few foreigners were interested in contem-
porary art, and some, like one of the main collectors at the time, Uli Sigg, pre-
ferred to buy directly from artists. One way to attract potential buyers was
through the restaurant.
Second, although some artists knew about the international models of galleries
and auction houses, and found them attractive, entrepreneurs needed to educate
local artists, auctioneers, and even investors, about how the models should work.
China Guardian rigorously trained its employees. Smith explained to investors
that she needed to establish the gallery’s reputation before the sales could be rea-
lized. Gallerists had to spell out for artists how collaborations should function.
“We are not a pawnshop,” is something Maggio says she had to constantly repeat
to artists:
You don’t place your objects here and walk away and wait for the day I call you and give you
money. […] This is a long-term relationship.58
The local context made certain types of institutional work unnecessary. For
example, in both cases the institutional work of “changing normative associa-
tions” – “re-making the connections between sets of practices and the moral
and cultural foundations for those practices” – did not have to be done.59 In
the environment of economic reforms, artists were excited by a new possibility
to make money, and buyers were thrilled to participate in an overt market activ-
ity, such as an auction. My interviews with artists, art dealers and others indicate
that artists did not take the organizational forms for granted, but they were
55 Chen 2014.
56 Zhang Xiaogang, Yue Minjun and Mao Yan are currently among the top Chinese artists.
57 Interview with Gan Xuejun, manager at China Guardian, July 2014.
58 Interview, Meg Maggio.
59 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006, 224.
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enthusiastic. For artists, it was a long-awaited opportunity to exhibit and sell
their work, to gain visibility. Artists did not require much persuasion to work
with new organizations that they quickly perceived as professional. Artists
were “super curious” about the new gallery model, as Maggio put it.
According to an artist who worked with the Courtyard Gallery in the 1990s:
Everyone wanted to cooperate with a gallery. Galleries were a new thing, they had just entered
China. We artists thought, what is a gallery, after all? If you work with a gallery, what would be
the results and the future? We had no idea. But if you could have an exhibition so that many
people would see your work, we were very happy.
Similarly, Smith said that artists “were really excited about that [auctions] in a
way, because it was something that seemed solid, that had a real kind of founda-
tion.”60 Also, for (potential) buyers, auctions were fascinating. “Auctions are a
novelty for the Chinese, who relate them to ordinary things like car number
plates and items seized by the customs department,” wrote Agence France
Press in 1994.61 Auctions quickly caught on: a steep admission fee even had to
be charged, for example, at China Guardian’s 1995 spring auction, to limit the
audience, as “[d]rawn by […] the excitement of seeing vast sums of money change
hands, local Chinese flocked to the event.”62
Alongside these similarities, other types of institutional work differed for gal-
lery and auction house, as they are differently positioned regarding the govern-
ment. In China, at least tacit approval by the authorities was required for
operation, so official legitimation was necessary. This was especially crucial for
the auction house. The China Guardian entrepreneurs engaged in a form of insti-
tutional work that Lawrence and Suddaby call “advocacy”: they needed to
obtain political and regulatory support.63 It was a “political” “institutionaliza-
tion project” related to market-building.64 Despite economic liberalization and
local authorities’ auction experiments, China Guardian needed official approval.
When applying for licences, they ran into problems: the officials at the State
Administration of Cultural Heritage worried that granting a licence to auction
cultural relics would lead to grave robberies. Chen and his associates needed to
use their networks to lobby for the desired outcomes. To legitimize auction
houses, which are large conspicuous organizations, entrepreneurs needed political
capital. They sought the support of official arts organizations and their leaders.
Chen relied on his network accumulated while working as a civil servant at a
research institute. Wang Yannan’s high profile was also useful, even though
she did not use her father’s surname, and did not seem to flaunt her high
cadre family background. Advocacy was only necessary in the beginning. The
auction house was quickly legitimated when a number of Party and government
leaders attended the first auction. The central television programme, Oriental
60 Interview, Karen Smith.
61 Leu 1994.
62 Dewar 1995.
63 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006.
64 DiMaggio 1988, 13.
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Horizon, praised it highly, predicting that Beijing would become an auction cap-
ital, on a par with New York and London.65 The China Association of
Auctioneers was established in 1995, and an auction law was issued in 1996.
Regulations for professional certification for auctioneers took effect in 1997.
Thus, within several years the significance of China Guardian’s first auction
was recognized and legitimized by the authorities.
In contrast, the galleries did not engage in “advocacy.” As foreigners and out-
siders to pre-existing traditional art structures, gallerists lacked the political capital
and other resources for advocacy. Also, there was little need to advocate. Dealers
active at the time told me that commercial galleries experienced neither support nor
serious restrictions. As small marginal inconspicuous organizations dealing with
contemporary art, galleries were of little interest to the authorities, and there
was tacit approval of local police or cadres, according to Maggio and other inter-
viewees. Wallace, who ran Red Gate gallery, told me that the authorities would
come by, “but then they’d just go away, really, they didn’t cause us too much trou-
ble.” They could overcome regulatory obstacles, such as restrictions on economic
activities of foreign nationals and companies, without advocacy, for example, by
collaborating with Chinese nationals or establishing galleries in hotels.
In sum, the institutional work was shaped by the local political, cultural and
institutional context. A lack of knowledge of contemporary art and of workings
of organizations, official requirements and attitudes towards market organizations
and towards contemporary art dictated what institutional work local actors had to
conduct. In these two cases in 1990s China, entrepreneurs had to educate local
actors about contemporary art and the workings of organizations and to have at
least tacit support of the authorities. Auction houses engaged in more “advocacy,”
while contemporary art “education” was more crucial for galleries, since auction
houses and galleries and their founders were differently positioned with relation
to these contextual factors. The atmosphere of embracing economic reforms ren-
dered the institutional work of “changing normative associations” unnecessary.
Transformations of Foreign Models as Unintended Consequences of
Institutional Work
Attempts at isomorphism did not result in complete mimesis; innovation accom-
panied imitation.66 Chinese organizations functioned differently from the originals.
For example, China Guardian received artworks for auction directly from artists,
unmediated by art dealers, which is considered illegitimate internationally.67 The
Courtyard Gallery did not promote artists at not-for-profit institutions, as galleries
are expected to do, and had an extraordinary business model (it was partly sup-
ported by profits from the restaurant). The relationship between galleries and
65 Chen 2014.
66 Westney 1987.
67 cf. Kharchenkova and Velthuis 2018.
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auction houses was also divergent. For instance, contrary to international conven-
tions, Chinese galleries were not initially buying or selling art at auction.
My interview and archival data suggest that the bricolage of pre-existing
socialist and new structures, which is often used to explain Chinese institutional
divergencies, does not account well for modifications of these two contemporary
art organizations. China Guardian drew on pre-existing institutions and relation-
ships embedded in the old structures and in the traditional art circuit, for
example, to obtain traditional art lots at cultural relics stores. However, China
Guardian could not readily rely on pre-existing structures where it came to con-
temporary art, because no old organizational template existed for contemporary
art commerce. Similarly, the Courtyard Gallery did not draw on pre-existing
structures. The differences also cannot be explained by a “mimicry” type of insti-
tutional work – an intentional layering of old and new to make the new models
understandable and point to shortcomings of the old practices.68 Organizational
forms were attractive due to their foreign novel character, and both the
Courtyard Gallery and China Guardian emphasized it.69 Additionally, early gal-
leries primarily dealt with foreigners and artists active outside of the official sys-
tem, so “mimicry” would not be useful.
Rather, my data suggest that the differences are largely due to what Lawrence
and colleagues call “unintended consequences” of institutional work: institu-
tional work may create institutions “very different from those originally con-
ceived of by the actors involved.”70 This, in turn, had to do with the fact that
the local environment to which the models were copied was not only politically,
culturally and institutionally different, but also emergent and unstructured. It
lacked contemporary art infrastructure, professionalization, consumers, and the
new organizations had different meanings for local actors – artists, potential
buyers, the authorities – compared to their original context. As a result, the orga-
nizations could not operate in line with the original models. My data clearly indi-
cate entrepreneurs’ objective to copy organizations, but the Chinese
organizations turned out to be different, therefore I conceptualize this as the
“unintended consequences” of institutional work.
For example, the auction house representatives approached artists directly with
a view to auctioning their works, because of a lack of galleries and collectors at
the time. As no market-related conventions, which forbid artists to collaborate
with auctions, existed, artists were eager, resulting in a different, more direct,
relationship. As a China Guardian manager explained:
A lot of people participated out of curiosity. […] auctions brought sales, but they also published
artworks in the catalogue, published books and made exhibitions, so that many collectors
would see them. At the time there was no other way, there were no galleries.71
68 Lawrence and Suddaby 2006.
69 Chen 2014, 59; interview with Maggio.
70 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2009, 10–11.
71 Interview with China Guardian manager, July 2014.
16 The China Quarterly, pp. 1–21
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741019000389
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Walaeus Library LUMC, on 05 Sep 2019 at 06:21:17, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
For the Courtyard Gallery, the international model of having a limited stable of
artists that galleries promote long-term, and where works by such artists would
only be sold through the gallery, did not work well, according to Maggio. The
gallerists could not promote artists at museums, because no contemporary art
museums to consecrate artists existed. The priority in an environment where con-
temporary art received no support was more immediate: to organize exhibitions
and to guarantee a living to the artists. If they had sold art before, artists dealt
directly with buyers, so they did not know what exactly to expect of a gallery
in terms of cooperation either. The Courtyard Gallery was supported by the res-
taurant due to a lack of contemporary art buyers.
Because the field was nascent and not yet professionalized, it lacked scripts and
institutionalized procedures on how to operate a gallery or an auction house. This
was exacerbated by the overall uncertainty and rapid changes of the reform per-
iod. Sometimes adjustments were spontaneous rather than planned and resulted
from a lack of experience and clarity about how galleries and auction houses
should operate locally. According to my respondents, gallerists were learning
by doing, and disagreed on how to run the gallery, especially early on.
According to Maggio, initially they:
…had no record keeping, they didn’t keep accounts, things were flying out the window, they
were working with other galleries from our gallery, it was a mess. 72
The China Guardian team did not know how to write a feasibility report, or how
the first auction would play out. All this highlights the uncertain character of
institutional work, resulting in unintended consequences and transformations
of original models.
These organizational differences can be explained by “translation” of models
to the Chinese context, which refers to modifications of institutions in a new
organizational context.73 However, they can also be explained by unintended
consequences of institutional work. Whereas translation refers to implicit or stra-
tegic search for solutions in the new environment, unintended consequences of
institutional work emphasize (partial) failure: a different, unintended outcome
of creating of organizational forms, or in this case, of bringing isomorphic organ-
izational forms to China.
Conclusions
This article has detailed micro-level mechanisms of importation of two organiza-
tional forms. This was a multi-level process with mimetic isomorphism taking
place on the transnational level (between mature markets abroad and a nascent
market in China), and institutional work taking place mostly locally. Although
isomorphism is usually understood as emphasizing structure, institutional entre-
preneurship and work underscore agency, and unintended consequences of
72 Interview, Meg Maggio.
73 Czarniawska and Joerges 1996.
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institutional work presuppose a lack of deliberate action; a combination of these
concepts is necessary to make sense of how the models were imported and
transformed.
The contributions of this article are twofold. First, this study contributes to
China scholarship, as it applied the concept of institutional work to China. It
conceptualized economic reforms since the 1970s and especially the 1990s as a
condition for institutional work of creating market institutions in China. One
advantage of this approach is that it offers an alternative explanation for institu-
tional differences in reform-era China. Although path dependence and a brico-
lage of elements of old and new institutions were relevant for traditional art
and antiques, I have argued that concerning contemporary art, modifications
of models can be best explained by the unintended consequences of institutional
work in an unstructured environment. This analysis underscores intentionality,
but also the messiness of institutional creation. The role of unintended conse-
quences of institutional work in creating divergences in other industries and mar-
kets in China, and the concrete dynamics associated with them, is a welcome
avenue of future research.
Another important advantage of this micro-level approach is that it highlights
individual agency in China’s organization-building.74 This study revealed the role
of foreign nationals, which, unlike the role of foreign investment and joint ven-
tures, has been neglected in sociological literature on China’s market develop-
ment. Their successful contributions were due to their cultural competence
among Western-oriented artists and foreigners dominating this nascent market
of contemporary art, as well as to the fact that they ran relatively small incon-
spicuous organizations. This study thus calls for more attention to micro-level
agency in studies of creation, maintenance and disruption of Chinese
organizations.
Second, this study contributes to institutional work literature by highlighting
how contextual factors (1) shaped institutional work and (2) led to unintended
consequences of institutional work. This helps address the current academic inter-
est in differences in institutionalization processes.75 Which contextual factors
beget which types of institutional work should be investigated further on the
empirical material in China and beyond. In addition, this article suggests further
studying the role of unexpected consequences of institutional work in the devel-
opment of organizations and markets. Unintended consequences seem especially
likely to occur in an unstructured environment; however, in what other kinds of
environments unintended consequences can be expected should be investigated
further.
Finally, this article suggests further applying institutional theory to China,
which, as I have shown, has analytic uses for the study of Chinese society.
Emphasizing the structure, the institutional approach also underscores the
74 cf. Nee and Opper 2012.
75 Lawrence, Suddaby and Leca 2011.
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creative agency. With its attention to the local rather than the universal, and to
the symbolic and cultural rather than rational dimensions of institutional diffu-
sion, its advantage is that it allows us to trace the intricate processes of building,
maintaining and disrupting institutions in post-Mao China.
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